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SUMMARY
We consider issues related to automating the process of fault-management (fault diagnosis and
response) for data management systems. Substantial benefits are to be gained by successful automation
of this process, particularly for large complex systems. We advocate the use of graph-based models
to develop a computer-assisted fault-management system. We begin by describing the general problem
and outlining the motivation behind choosing graph-based models over other approaches for developing
fault-diagnosis computer programs. We review some existing work in the area of graph-based fault-
diagnosis, and offer a new fault-management method which we have developed from existing methods.
We apply our method to an automatic telescope system intended as a prototype for future lunar telescope
programs. Finally, we describe the application of our method to general data-management systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Fault management is an important issue that must be addressed in the design and operation of
large data systems. Typically a complex system is overseen by one or more human operators who are
responsible for the correct operation of the system. Human operators are responsible for diagnosing
any failures within the system and for formulating courses of action in response to the failures. The
system often exhibits a set of symptoms that characterize a specific failure. From these symptoms the
human operators must infer causes of the failure, consequences to the system, and what operational
adjustment is necessary to compensate for the inferred failures. As stated, this process relies heavily
upon human expertise and can be prone to errors in judgment. Systems that exceed a certain size and
complexity invariably exceed the capacity of human diagnosis and fault management. Therefore, a
substantial benefit may be obtained by automating the process. Such automation could be achieved by
developing a computer program capable of analyzing sets of symptoms exhibited by a system. The
computer program would be capable of inferring specific component failures most likely to be causes of
the symptoms, and optionally providing recommendations to human operators for effective courses of
action. The corrective recommendations could range from performing diagnostics and gathering further
failure information, to suggesting repair, reconfiguration, or altering operating procedures to compensate
for diagnosed failure. If the diagnostic program is integrated with a hardware system, the program can
implement any of the courses of action discussed and would not require human intervention. Such a
system would constitute a fully automated recovery system, which could significantly improve reliability
and performance.
There are several issues involved in the design and development of a fault management computer
advisor program, such as that described above. The program should be able to accommodate large,
complex systems. The program should be reasonably easy for non-computer-specialists to use. Results
of the analysis performed by the program must be provided for display in a manner understandable to the
human operator. Ideally, the display should operate in an intuitive manner, otherwise human operators
are likely distrust the computer's diagnosis or recommendations. Since the intended subject of the
analysis is a data system in operation, the analysis must be capable of being completed and available for
display in a timely manner because human operators will need to respond quickly to whatever failures
have occurred. A major issue to consider is the type of system model the advisor program is to use
for the analysis process. The type of model can have a major impact on the resources required for the
design and implementation of both the advisor program and the model itself. It can also have a major
effecton how well theprogramand modeladdressandresolvetheother issuesmentionedabove.We
discusssomeoptionsfor underlyingsystemmodelsin thenext section.
2 MODEL TECHNIQUES FOR FAULT MANAGEMENT
There are several different approaches available for addressing the above fault management prob-
lem. An obvious possibility is the use of a traditional rule-based expert system. It has long been estab-
lished that such systems are well-suited to the type of inferential reasoning required by a computer-based
fault management advisor. However, rule-based expert systems have a number of drawbacks. One of the
most important of these is the fact that these systems tend to be large, complex, and difficult to maintain.
In addition, the rule base can be difficult to construct and debug, often requiring the services of artificial
intelligence (AI) specialists to initially develop and sometimes to maintain a system. Another factor
specific to this particular application is the potential for integration of inferential diagnosis reasoning
with other system analysis measures, such as reliability. There is no natural method for integrating
reliability calculation with inferential reasoning in rule-based expert systems.
The Dependable Multiprocessing group in the Computational Systems Research Branch, Informa-
tion Sciences Division at NASA Ames Research Center has been working with an alternate approach to
developing a fault management advisor. Specifically, we have been investigating the use of digraphs and
AND-OR fault trees to build models of the target system. The resulting analytical models can then be
analyzed to produce the desired inferential reasoning to map a set of symptoms into a set of candidate
faults and to evaluate the effect of both the faults and any proposed workaround procedures on the
system as a whole. Both digraphs and fault trees are static failure space models and do not involve
simulation. They model the system by depicting the effect of faults and failures on the system. They
both belong to a class of models called combinatorial analytic models, which express system behavior
in terms of the ways that individual component/subsystem failures combine together to affect the overall
system. We offer a brief description of both digraphs and AND-OR fault trees in the paragraphs below.
Digraphs
The term digraph stands for directed graph. A digraph consists of a number of nodes (depicted by
circles) connected by a number of directed arcs. A node usually represents the occurrence of a particular
event, such as the failure of an individual component or subsystem. The directed arcs depict how the
effects of failures/events propagate through the system. In addition to nodes and directed arcs, digraphs
may contain AND gates. An AND gate is represented by a bar, a number of directed arcs terminating on
one side of the bar that represent input events to the gate, and a single directed arc emanating from the
opposite side of the bar which represents the output event of the gate. The output event occurs only if all
of the in_put events occur. Digraph models usually follow the schematic of a system fairly closely since
the effect of failures often propagate along the physical/electrical connections between individual system
components, and the schematic is intended to depict precisely these physical/electrlcal connections. This
close structural similarity of the model with the systern means that the model is usually much easier to
construct and verify than a set of abstract inference rules, such as is required by the rule-based expert
systems mentioned above.
Thefailureof acomponentor occurrence of an event is represented in the model by the highlighting
or marking of the digraph node that represents that component/event. The propagation of the effect of
the Component failure is represented by the subsequent marking of all nodes to which a directed arc
exists from the marked node. The overall propagation throughout the system of the component failure
is achieved by recursively applying this marking procedure to the newly marked nodes which were
directly affected by the initially marked node. The justification for this procedure lies in the assumption
that a failed component can, and usually does, produce erroneous output, and that the components that
depend on the failed component's output for their input will subsequently produce erroneous output
themselves due to the erroneous nature of their input. In this way, the effect of a specific component
failure/event on other system components and ultimately on the system as a whole may be traced in the
model.
Similarly, the model may be used to identify all the singleton and sets of combinations of nodes
whose failure may lead to the failure of a specific "target" node in the digraph. A digraph model of a
system can give a designer, engineer, or diagnostician a pictorial view of how individual or combinations
of failures can propagate through the system and affect other components in the system. The model
in which the propagation is displayed is likely to be similar to structural diagrams of the system, and
this can help the human observer assimilate the effect of individual failures more easily than is possible
with other modeling techniques. This type of intuitive presentation of the information is important for
facilitating understanding of the problem and its consequences by the human operator who ultimately
will be responsible for deciding which actions will address failures that have occurred.
Figure 1 shows an example system and a digraph model for it. The system consists of a spaceborne
processor which performs monitoring of the spacecraft's operational status and reports its findings to
a ground control station on earth. Within the spacecraft, the data are sent over a bus to a pair of
redundant transmitters that both transmit to the ground receiver. The ground control station can receive
the data successfully if either one of the transmitters is operational. The bottom portion of figure 1
shows a digraph model of the system. The node labeled "ground receiver" represents the event where
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram and digraph model for an example system.
the groundcontrol stationis unableto receivethespacecraft'sdatasuccessfully.The digraphindicates
that a failure of the processorcould preventacorrecttransferof dataover thebusfrom being initiated.
Eithera datatransferfailure or a busfailure couldcausethedatato be incorrectlyreceivedfrom thebus
by eitherof the two transmitters.Eithera datareceptionfailure by the transmitter,or a failure within
the transmitteritself could causethe transmitterto incorrectlysendthe datato theground receiver.A
failure to correctlyreceivethedatamight becausedeitherby both transmittersbeingunableto transmit
thedataor by the failure of the groundreceiveritself. Thusafailure in anyof thenodesof the digraph
(indicatedby marking the node)canand probablywill propagatethroughthe systemas indicatedby
the directedarcsthroughthedigraph.
Fault Trees
Fault trees are another type of graph-based model of system behavior. A fault tree model of a
system consists of a number of basic events depicted by circles, a number of intermediate events depicted
by boxes, a number of logic gates that express various combinations of basic and intermediate events,
and a number of arcs which connect the basic and intermediate events to gates. Basic events represent
fundamental events such as the failure of a single system component. Intermediate events usually
represent events like the failure of a subsystem. For our purposes here we are primarily interested in
a class of fault trees which contain only two types of gates: AND gates and OR gates. Each gate has
a number of input arcs which originate at an event (basic or intermediate) or at the output of some
other gate. Each gate also has one output arc which goes to either an intermediate event or to one or
more other gates. An AND gate produces an output only if all of its input events occur. An OR gate
produces an output if any of its input events occur. Any event or gate output may serve as an input to
more than one gate, and such an event is termed a repeated event.
Fault trees model a system by depicting how various combinations of individual component/
subsystem failures act together to affect the system as a whole. The fault tree usually has a single
root event at the top of the tree, called the undesired or top event, which represents the primary failure
event of interest. Often the top event represents catastrophic failure of the entire system. The fault
tree model is developed by examining all the basic or intermediate events, which individually or in
combination with other events, may cause the top event to occur. The top event then becomes the
output event of an OR gate whose inputs are all the intermediate events which by themselves could
cause the top event to occur. If the top event can only be caused by the combined occurrence of
some set of intermediate events, the top event will instead be the output event of an AND gate whose
inputs are those intermediate events. The fault tree is then developed by recursively examining each
intermediate event in turn and determining whether it is the output of an AND gate or an OR gate.
This recursive development continues until all intermediate events have been decomposed and all of
the most fundamental events in the fault tree are basic events. The development of a fault tree model
is consequently a "top-down" decomposition process. This is in contrast to the development process
for a digraph model which is a "bottom-up" forward-failure propagation process from the individual
components to the more complex subsystems and ultimately the system as a whole. The perspectives
of the two model types are complementary.
Figure 2 shows a fault tree model for the example system of figure 1. The top event of the fault
tree denotes the failure of the ground control station to successfully receive the spacecraft's data. The
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Figure 2. Fault tree model for the example system.
failure to successfully receive the data might be due either to a failure of the spaceborne subsystem or
to a failure of the ground-based subsystem (the receiver). A failure of the spaceborne subsystem could
be due either to a failure of the transmitter subsystem or to a failure of the processing subsystem. A
failure of the transmitter subsystem requires the failure of both transmitters. A failure of the processing
subsystem could be due to a failure of either the processor or the bus.
3 FDIR USING GRAPH MODELS
In this section we review some existing work which has been done on the subject of fault man-
agement using graph-based models. In the previous section we described two graph-based modeling
methods: digraphs and fault trees. ':['he fault management methods we are about to describe are all
procedures for analyzing a model of the system which is either a digraph or a fault tree. In order to
begin the diagnosis process, all of the methods below require identification of components whose status
is observable (for example sensors) and information about which sensors are operating correctly and
which are not. This information may be obtained through user inputs to the model or by automated
real-time monitoring of sensor outputsl _ This information is presented to the graph-based models in
the following form: sensors that are known to be "good" (output within operational limits) are said to
be normal alarms; sensors that are known to be "bad" (output outside of operational limits) are said
to be abnormal alarms. Some of the diagnosis methods described below have the capability to take
into account the propagation time of failures from one component to another. For these methods the
normal and abnormal alarms include the latest time at which the sensor is known to be good or bad.
Once the normal and abnormal alarms have been specified, the result of the analysis of the model is
the identification of a set of components (both sensor and non-sensor) whose failure could account for
a set of observed symptoms exhibited by the system. At the end of this section we present our most
recent fault management method, which is based on the use of both digraphs and fault trees.
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Digraph Fault Management Using FEAT
A digraph modeling software tool called Failure Environment Analysis Tool (FEAT) was developed
by Lockheed Engineering and Sciences together with NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) (ref. 1). FEAT
allows a user to build and analyze a digraph model of a complex system. The program has a graphical
user interface which displays a digraph and uses color highlighting of digraph nodes and AND gates to
pictorially display the results of digraph analyses. Among the major features of FEAT are the source
and target operations. When the user selects or marks a digraph node and performs a source operation,
FEAT identifies all nodes in the digraph that would become marked as a result of the propagation of the
marking of the selected node. The marking of a digraph node corresponds to a failure of the component
represented by the node. When a digraph node is selected and a target operation is performed, FEAT
identifies all digraph nodes from which a marking could propagate to the selected node. Where the
marking of a single digraph node could propagate to a target node, the single node is called a singleton
and is highlighted in red on the digraph diagram. Where the coincident marking of two distinct nodes
is required to cause the target node to be marked, the two nodes together are called a doubleton and
are highlighted in blue. The user may therefore identify which digraph nodes affect or are affected by
a selected individual node through the use of the target and source operations, respectively.
Using this tool, researchers at JSC and McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company have devel-
oped a method of identifying a set of digraph nodes (representing failure of individual system compo-
nents), which could potentially account for a symptom exhibited by the system in the form of a marked
target node in the system model (ref. 2). The method starts by identifying sensors that fall into three
categories: sensors that are known to be good (the normal alarms), sensors that are known to be bad
(the abnormal alarms), and sensors whose status is unknown due to corruption of their output data or
which are not relevant to the current operational mode. Using these sets of observable components, the
failure propagation relationships expressed in the digraph model are used to determine possible causes
for bad sensor readings and components that must be working to provide the good sensor readings. This
information is used to successively prune the set of candidate components (both sensor and non-sensor
components), which might be responsible for the symptom represented by the target node. The pruning
process makes use of the digraph analysis operations available in FEAT and may be followed picto-
rially by the analyst. It proceeds by successively identifying subsets from the initial set of candidate
components that may be inferred to be working correctly from the failure propagation information in
the digraph. At this time the user must manually perform the identification steps and prune the set of
candidate components as new subsets of correctly operating components are identified. Future plans
call for this manual procedure to be automated.
Interactive Digraph Analysis ODA)
David lverson has developed a computer program that implements a variation of the digraph fault
diagnosis method described above. The primary difference between the two methods lies in the fact
that Iverson's method uses cut sets of digraph nodes to identify and prune sets of candidate components
which could be responsible for causing the system's failure symptoms, whereas the JSC/McDonnell
Douglas method uses the singleton/doubleton identification features of FEAT to identify and prune the
sets of candidate components. A cut set for a digraph node is a set of nodes which, when all marked,
cause the digraph node itself to be marked. We note here that neither method takes into account the
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time requiredfor failures to propagatethroughindividual digraph nodes,so no timing information is
given aspartof thenormal/abnormalalarmspecifications,andpropagationtimeis not consideredin the
diagnosisprocess.Iverson'smethodworks in the following way: for eachdigraphnodethatrepresents
a normalalarm (a sensoroperatingcorrectly)all of thecut setsof thatnodearefound. Next, all nodes
that representabnormalalarms(sensorswhoseoutputis outsideof operationallimits) are identifiedand
all madeinputs into a singlenew AND gate. Theoutput nodeof this AND gatedenotesthe observed
failure symptomsexhibitedby the system.The cut setsfor the outputnodeof this new AND gateare
thenfound. Thesecut setsrepresentall thepossiblecausesof thesymptoms.The actualcause(s)of the
observedsymptomswill be somesubsetof thesecut sets.The AND gatecut setsare thencompared
with the combinedcut setsfor the normalalarm nodes,and any cut set of the AND gate for which
one of the normal alarmcut setsis a subsetis thrown out. This last step is justified by the following
reasoning:if a cut setof theAND gateis a true causeof the failure symptoms,thenall the eventsin
thecut setmust haveoccurredin orderfor theAND gateoutputeventto occur.However,if a subsetof
theeventsin thecut setarealsoa cut setfor a normalalarm, thenthoseeventscannot haveoccurred.
Therefore,anycut set of the AND gatewhich containsasa subseta normalalarmcut set cannot
haveoccurredandhencecannotbeacauseof thesystemfailuresymptoms.Suchacut setcanbepruned
from the set of candidatecausesof the failure. Any AND gatecut setsremainingafter this pruning
processidentify the possibletrue causesof the systemfailure symptoms.This methodis implemented
as part of a generalprogramfor analyzingdigraphscalled the InteractiveDigraph Analysis program
(IDA). IDA differs from FEAT in that it is basedon cut setsinsteadof matrix methodsand lacks the
graphicaluser interfacethat FEAT offers.
Method of Narayanan and Viswanadham
Narayanan and Viswanadham describe an approach to fault management which involves an inte-
grated use of digraphs, fault trees, and an AI production rule inference engine (ref. 3). They advocate
dividing the diagnosis process into two phases: a failure source location phase and a failure cause
identification phase. Each of these phases are analyzed separately using different underlying system
models. The failure source location phase involves constructing a hierarchicial model of the system
using multi-level digraphs. A symptom of abnormal system behavior is then expressed by the marking
of a target node (failure of a subsystem) in the highest order level of the digraph model. The digraph
on the highest level is then analyzed to find the subsystems (represented by digraph nodes on that level)
whose failure could lead to the marking of the target node. Each such subsystem is then optionally
modeled in greater detail by another digraph at a lower level of detail resolution. The digraph analysis is
then recursively performed on these lower level digraphs. This recursive decomposition/analysis process
is continued down until eventually the lowest level of modeling resolution that is of interest to the user
is reached. Once digraph nodes whose marking could lead to the marking of the top level target node
are identified on that lowest level, cause-consequence models of failure are constructed to capture the
failure modes of the identified candidate components/subsystems. The cause-consequence models are
augmented fault trees. The fault trees are augmented to contain heuristic and systematic knowledge
about temporal, probabilistic, and causal characteristics of faults that occur in the component/subsystem.
Once constructed, the augmented fault trees are used to generate production rule knowledge bases for
the components/subsystems. As a final step, the failure cause identification process is invoked to ana-
lyze the production rule knowledge bases to infer what the causes of failure might be. The inferential
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reasoningproceedsthroughforwardandbackwardchainingoperationson therules,Thisreasoningpro-
cesseliminatesfrom considerationpotentialcausesof failurebasedon thenormalalarms,theabnormal
alarms,the time requiredfor individual failuresto propagatethroughthesubsystems,andinformation
on theimportanceandprobabilityof propagationof failures.
Fault Tree Diagnosis System
David Iverson and Ann Patterson-Hine have implemented a modified version of Narayanan and
Viswanadham's approach to modeling cause-effect relations for failure diagnoses (refs. 4-6). Narayanan
and Viswanadham advocate the use of augmented fault trees to generate a production rule knowledge
base. Inferential reasoning about failure causes is then performed through forward and backward chain-
ing on the production rules in the knowledge base. This approach of representing the knowledge base
with production rules has some drawbacks. One performance-related drawback is the relatively large
amount of overhead processing needed to search through the rule base in the course of forward and
backward chaining. Another drawback is the increased computational resources needed to generate and
store a second representation (the production rules) of the knowledge base that is already completely
represented in the augmented fault tree, !verson and Patterson-Hine addressed these two drawbacks by
developing methods to perform the inferential reasoning processes on the augmented fault tree directly,
thus obviating the need to generate the production rules. They implemented the augmented fault tree
using an object-oriented fault tree paradigm developed by Patterson-Hine (ref. 7). In addition to saving
the effort needed to generate and store the production rules, they found that accessing the information
in the knowledge base was more efficient than searching an indexed rule base, This follows from the
fact that the structure of the fault tree itse!f encodes the production rules of the knowledge base, Each
gate in the fault tree represents a production rule in that the inputs and output of the gate are the an-
tecedents and consequent, respectively, of a production rule in the knowledge base. During a forward or
backward chaining operation, the next rule(s) needed are immediately available by virtue of the implicit
links between rules embodied in the structure of the fault tree. Separate lookup operations on a table
of rules are not required, The resulting diagnosis program is called the Fault Tree Diagnosis System
(FTDS) and permits the modeling and diagnosis of system failure causes with a user-entered fault tree
model. As FEAT does for digraphs, FTDS uses a graphical user interface and displays the course and
results of a diagnosis analysis with color highlighting of the fault tree model. FTDS is implemented
under X Windows in Unix(TM) computing environments.
An Integrated Graph-Based Diagnosis Method
We now describe an integrated graph-based diagnosis approach (IGBDM) to the fault management
problem which is under development by our group at NASA Ames Research Center. Our approach
differs from the integrated approach of Narayanan and Viswanadham in the role played by the digraph.
Narayanan and Viswanadham advocated using an analysis of the digraph to determine fault location
within the system, then feeding the results of that analysis to production rule knowledge bases to
determine the cause of the failure(s) identified by the digraph analysis. In our approach we advocate a
more modest role for the digraph. Like Narayanan and Viswanadham, we rely on an augmented fault
tree knowledge base to provide determinations of causes of failures through appropriate analysis of
the fault tree model. However, we assume that inputs to the augmented fault tree analysis process are
available from the user in the form of a specification of the failure symptoms exhibited by the system, In
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otherwords,we rely onmonitoringof sensorsand/oruserinputinsteadof aprecursorydigraphanalysis
to provide the temporalstatusinformationaboutsystemcomponentsneededasinput by thefault tree
analysisprocess.The digraphmodelof the systemthen takeson a new role underour approach.We
usea digraphmodel of the systemto aid in the constructionof the augmentedfault treemodel rather
thanasasubjectfor analysis.Themotivationbehindthisstemsfrom concernsrelatedto humanactivity
in building thesystemmodel. Theprocessof building a fault treemodelof a systemis readilylearned,
but is not alwaysan intrinsically naturalprocessandsomay requirethedevelopmentof someexpertise
on the part of the modeler. Digraphs,becauseof their tendencyto be very similar to the schematic
of a system,are often moreeasily developed.This is particularlytrue when the modeleris someone
whosetraining has not includedextensiveemphasisin systemsmodeling. A computerprogramwas
recentlydevelopedto converta digraphmodelinto a fault treemodel (ref. 8). This programpermitsthe
formulationof a systemmodel in themoreeasilyspecifieddigraphformat. The digraphmodel is then
automaticallyconvertedto a fault treemodeland augmentedwith the informationneededfor analysis
to determinea diagnosis.If the digraphandaugmentedfault treemodelsarelinked together,the fault
managementadvisorprogramcanperformall analysison an internalfault treemodel while providing
theusertheopportunityto enterthesystemmodelandmonitortheresultsof theanalyseswith a digraph.
This permitstheprogramto interactwith theuservia a modeltypewhich is moreeasilyaccommodated
by the userwhile performingthe analysisfunctionswith a model type moresuited to the computer's
inferentialreasoningprocesses.The implementationof our diagnosisapproachdescribedhereis under
developmentandwill be implementedin a Unix(TM) environmentunderX Windows.
4 EXAMPLE PROBLEM
We now describe the application of our fault management/diagnosis method to an example problem.
We model a real system which is being designed and built. The system is an automated telescope being
built by the Autoscope Corporation. Autoscope builds automated telescopes intended for unattended
operation for extended periods of time in remote areas, such as on secluded mountaintops in the south-
western desert where astronomical observation opportunities are among the best in the United States.
The technology that Autoscope is developing has potential application for future NASA programs using
telescopes on orbiting platforms or on the moon. We begin by giving an overview of how this current
fault management project could fit into a larger NASA program using automated telescopes. We then
describe the specific Autoscope automated telescope used for our study. We next develop the digraph
model of the telescope subsystem chosen for analysis for this study. Finally, we describe the applica-
tion of our fault diagnosis method to determine which specific component failures account for certain
specified symptoms of abnormal system behavior.
Lunar Telescopes
The automated telescope used for our study is a proposed prototype for the Steerable Automatic
Lunar Ultraviolet Telescope Explorer (SALUTE) project, The motivation behind the SALUTE project
is the assertion that it is only a matter of time before humans return to take up permanent presence
on the moon. When they do, it is certain (given the ideal conditions for astronomical observation the
moon offers) that they will bring telescopes with them and initiate major astronomical research projects.
Because relatively little is known about the maintenance and operation of precision mechanical devices
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in generaland telescopesin particular in the lunarenvironment,it is logical to gain someengineering
experiencein this areabeforemakingsubstantialinvestmentsin largecomplextelescopesandinstalling
themon themoon. The mostobviousway of achievingthis engineeringexperienceis to placesmall,
relativelyinexpensiveautomatedtelescopeson themoonin orderto gaininformationabouthowthelunar
environmentwill affecttheoptical, mechanical,andelectronicequipmentusedin lunar telescopes.The
roleof thesetelescopesis thereforetwo-fold: to evaluatethetechnologyrequiredto construct,maintain,
andoperatelunar telescopes,andsecondarilyto provideworking (albeit relativelysmall) telescopesto
allow lunarastronomicalresearchto begin immediatelyratherthanhaveto wait until humansareready
to establisha permanentpresenceon themoon.
Under the SALUTE project a number of small automatedtelescopeswould be soft-landedat
various locations on the moon. Each telescope would communicate with a control center on earth
through two communications links (a high-bandwidth link primarily for data and a low-bandwidth link
primarily for commands). Researchers on earth would direct the observations made by the telescopes by
uploading commands to the telescope over the communications links, and the telescopes would transmit
the gathered data back to earth over the same links. The telescopes include several computers on board
that are capable both of determining the individual steps required to make the observations (such as
how to locate and acquire a star, or how to make appropriate background and reference measurements)
and also of directing the telescope movements needed to perform the observations. The commands
uploaded from earth can therefore be of a very high-level nature (for example: observe this specific star
every X hours for Y minutes to obtain photometric measurements). The intent is to keep the operational
expense of the system to a minimum, and the project will rely on the use of computer-assisted automated
management systems (for fault diagnosis and management, AI-based planning and scheduling) to keep
earth-based ground control staff and resource requirements very low. The system also is intended to be
widely accessible to researchers from small colleges and possibly even selected high school students.
This will be practical only if the system has a very low overhead cost.
The Autoscope Telescope
The system we chose to analyze for our study is a model AT-16 automated telescope manufactured
by Autoscope Corporation. The telescope is designed as part of an integrated automated observatory
which is capable of performing (without human intervention) all functions required to operate all electri-
cal and mechanical equipment needed for astronomical observation. The goal is to permit astronomers
to direct nightly observations and analyze data obtained from those observations from the comfort of
their offices rather than personally traveling to observatories located in remote areas. This is accom-
plished by enabling the astronomers to issue commands to the observatory over ordinary phone lines
using a PC with a modem in their office. These commands specify what observations to make and how
to make them. The observatory is responsible for making the observations and gathering the resulting
data. The process of carrying out this responsibility requires that the observatory be able to perform
the following functions: scheduling the observations in an appropriate way following whatever priori-
ties are specified, ensuring that observations are made only between sundown and sunrise, monitoring
the weather and closing down if bad weather would damage the telescope or equipment, monitoring
and reporting equipment failures to appropriate human maintenance personnel, and taking appropriate
corrective action in response to equipment failures. Following a night of observations, the astronomer
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retrievesthe collecteddatafor analysis,againoverordinaryphonelines using a PC and a modem. The
presence of humans in the operation is required only in the event of equipment failures.
Figure 3 shows a diagram of the automated observatory. Two modems are available for reception
of instructions and transmission of data. A master observatory computer interfaces the observatory with
the outside world by mediating and responding to communications to/from the modems. The master
computer communicates with the controllers for the astronomical instruments (photometer and charge
coupled device camera) used for making measurements. These instruments also provide feedback
data to the control computer. The master computer also communicates with a telescope/observatory
control computer which is responsible for most of the functional operation of the observatory. The
telescope/observatory control computer communicates with the weather station to monitor the weather
conditions and close down the observatory if damaging weather conditions develop. Through inter-
mediary telescope and observatory controllers, the control computer also directs the movements and
functions of the telescope itself and observatory enclosure, power supplies, and environmental control
devices. Humans (when present) can communicate with the master computer through a keyboard and
monitor.
Figure 4 shows a picture of the telescope which is the subject of our study. Figure 5 shows a
simplified diagram of the telescope. We now offer a very brief description of the major features of
the telescope that are relevant to the model we are using for our study. The main components are a
large primary mirror and a smaller secondary mirror, both contained in a protective tube. Light enters
the tube at the top and travels to the bottom of the tube where it reflects off the primary mirror. The
light next travels back to the top of the tube where it is reflected back yet again off the secondary
mirror. It then travels back to the bottom of the tube and through the middle of the primary mirror to
measuring instruments located behind the primary mirror. Generally only one instrument receives the
incoming light at a time; however the light may be directed to as many as four different instruments
by an instrument selection device. The directional orientation of the tube may be moved, allowing the
telescope to be aimed anywhere in a large expanse of the sky. Directional pointing of the telescope is
accomplished by three stepper motors (X, Y, and Z) which are under computer control. Three additional
motors (T, U, and V) control movements of the secondary mirror, which may be adjusted independently
of the primary mirror and the rest of the telescope body. The stepper motors are supplied by two
power supplies, a 5-Volt and a 24-Volt power supply. The T, U, and V motors are supplied by both
the 5-Volt and the 24-Volt power supply, providing for a limited amount of redundancy (if the 24-Volt
power supply fails, these motors can still operate, but will move more slowly when supplied by only
the 5-Volt power supply). The X, Y, and Z motors are supplied only by the 24-Volt power supply and
do not have the benefit of any redundancy with respect to power.
For the purposes of this segment of the study we decided to concentrate our attention on the
TCS-200 telescope controller subsystem of the overall telescope. The telescope controller is the most
complex subsystem in the telescope, and is responsible for directing telescope operations and movements
in response to commands from the control computer. It is represented by the box labeled "Telescope
Controller" shown in figure 3. Figure 6 shows a simplified schematic of the telescope controller subsys-
tem. The controller subsystem consists of three parts: a control card which plugs into an expansion slot
within the telescope control computer (an IBM 386 class PC), the controller unit itself, and a number
of peripheral sensor and motor devices which actually perform the operations on the telescope. The
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Figure 3. Schematic diagram for an automated observatory system.
telescope control card (left side of (fig. 6)) provides the controller subsystem's interface with the control
computer. The controller itself (see center of (fig. 6)) contains a 24-Volt and a 5-Volt power supply,
a number of various drivers for the peripheral sensors and motors, and a junction board which routes
signals received from the telescope control card to the individual drivers. The drivers are connected
through ports to the sensors and motors located on the telescope frame shown in the right side of
Figure 6. There are a number of probe points located throughout the controller junction board at which
signals may be monitored by a diagnostics subsystem (one is currently under development by Autoscope)
or by a human technician. The motors include devices like the various stepper motors which move the
12
Figure4. Automatedtelescope.
telescopeframealongspecificdirectionsandarenecessaryfor positioningthe telescopesothat the lens
is centeredon the specificobjectto beobserved.
System Model
Figure 7 displays the digraph model for the simplified telescope controller subsystem. The general
structure of the digraph parallels the topological structure of the schematic of figure 6 fairly closely.
The digraph indicates that failures can propagate from the control computer digraph node (labeled "Tel-
CntrlComp") to the telescope control card (digraph node labeled "TelCntrICard"), through the various
ports to the controller junction board (digraph node labeled "JB"). From the junction board, failures can
propagate through the various ports to individual drivers, then on to the individual peripheral devices.
The propagation of failures therefore can be seen to follow the structural and electrical connections
within the subsystem as depicted in the schematic. There are a number of disconnected digraph seg-
ments that depict the effect of propagation of failures in the power supplies. The various drivers and
peripheral devices are dependent on One or the other of the two power supplies, so the failure of one
13
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power supply will determine which subset of the drivers and/or devices will be affected. Since the
telescope controller subsystem used for this example has been simplified for the purposes of illustration,
not all failure modes of the telescope controller are reflected in the system model presented here.
Fault Diagnosis Using the Model
The digraph model shown in figure 7 was developed with the aid of the FEAT digraph modeling
tool. In order to perform diagnosis processing, the digraph model is first converted to a fault tree. This
is accomplished by a conversion program (ref. 8) which automatically generates an equivalent fault tree
model from a digraph. Figure 8 shows the fault tree obtained from the conversion of the digraph in
figure 7. Briefly, the conversion process proceeds in the following way: for each node in the digraph,
an OR gate is created in the fault tree which contains the same label as the digraph node. The OR gate
has one basic event input which denotes an independent failure of the component represented by the
digraph node. The label of the basic event is the label of the digraph node with "-F" appended. The
OR gate also has one input for each incoming directed arc to the digraph node being converted. Each
of these fault tree input events represents a propagated failure or event corresponding to the individual
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Figure 6. Schematic diagram for the TCS 200 telescope controller subsystem.
incoming digraph arc and the digraph node from which it originates. This procedure reflects the fact
that each node of the digraph represents a failure that may be due either to a failure of the component
itself or a failure propagated along one of the inputs to the digraph node. The AND gates in the digraph
are converted directly into AND gates in the fault tree. The fault tree in Figure 8 has been slightly
modified to remove some redundant event nodes that are produced by the automatic conversion process,
but which have no meaning in the diagnosis process.
Once in the form of the fault tree, the FTDS program may be used to perform diagnostic analyses.
FTDS displays the fault tree on the user's screen and permits the user to identify components/subsystems
which are known to be working at specific times (normal alarms) and also components/subsystems which
are known to be failed at specific times (abnormal alarms, or the symptoms). From this information,
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FTDS first uses forward and backward-chaining through the production rules implicit in the structure of
the fault tree to determine all the components and subsystems that must be working and the latest times
at which they must be working in order for the normal alarms to be satisfied. FTDS then uses backward-
and forward-chaining through the fault tree to determine which must have failed (and the latest times at
which they must have failed) in order for the abnormal alarms to be accounted for. The result is a set of
candidate components whose failure could be the cause of the observed abnormal alarms. If more than
one cause is identified, further investigation in the form of diagnostics may be needed to identify the
component(s) whose failure was the actual cause of the symptoms (abnormal alarms). The conversion
process produces a fault tree whose basic event nodes have a one-to-one correspondence with the nodes
of the digraph. As a consequence of this, the results of the diagnosis may be transferred back to the
digraph and displayed pictorially to the user. The user may then see, through color highlighting, the
results of the diagnosis on both the digraph and the system schematic.
As a simple example, consider the digraph and fault tree models of the TCS 200 controller sub-
system shown in figures 7 and 8. Suppose it has been determined (either through monitoring of sensors
or human observation) that at time interval 5 the T Stepper motor (digraph and fault tree nodes labeled
T_Stepper) is not operating correctly. Suppose further that it is known through monitoring that at time
interval 4 the junction board (digraph and fault tree nodes labeled JB) is operating correctly. Our diagno-
sis will proceed under the assumption that it takes one time unit for the effects of a failure to propagate
through each node in the digraph. In terms of the fault tree this means that a failure takes one time unit
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to propagatefrom a gate to the gate immediatelyaboveit, with the exceptionthat propagationfrom
basiceventslabeled"<node>-F" to anOR gatelabeled"<node>" immediatelyabovethebasicevent,
takeszerotime units. The assumptionof a one-unitpropagationtime is arbitrary.Thepropagationtimes
may in fact be individually specifiedfor eachnodein the fault treeto moreaccuratelypredict actual
propagationconditions. The diagnosisprocessis begunby telling FTDS that the system/subsystem
representedby the top nodeof thefault treewasobservedto havefailed at a specifiedtime (time 10).
FTDSbeginsby examiningall of the normalalarmsthathavebeensetandinferringwhich components
musthavebeenworking at what latesttime in order for the normalalarmsto havebeenableto exist
asspecified. If the junction boardwasknown to be operatingcorrectlyat time interval4, the telescope
control computer(labeledTelCntrlComp)andthe telescopecontrol card(labeledTelCntrlCard)hadto
beworking correctlyat (andbefore)time intervals2 and3, respectively.Theseare theonly inferences
that canbe madebasedon the normalalarms.FTDSnext considerstheabnormalalarms,which here
includesonly the failure of the T_Stepperat time interval 5. This failure might be causedeither by
the failure of the steppermotor itself (node labeledT_Stepper-F)or by the failure of the T-Bilevel
drive (node labeledT_Bilev_Drv). The failure of the T-Bilevel drive might be causedby the failure
of thedrive itself (nodelabeledT_Bilev_Drv-F)or by the failure of bothpowersupplies(nodelabeled
24V_and_5V).The event representedby the nodelabeled24V_and_5Vwill only occur if the events
labeled5V_Power-Fand24V_Power-Fbothoccur.Hence,the setof candidatecausesfor theabnormal
alarmsis determinedto be { (T_Stepper-Fat time 5 or before),(T_Bilev_Drv-Fat time 4 or before),
(5V_Power-Fat time 3 or before),(24V_Power-Fat time 3 or before)}. This setcanbeprunedfurther
if moreinformationis knownin termsof normalalarms.For example,if it is knownthat theV Stepper
(nodelabeledV_Stepper)is operatingcorrectlyat time interval5, then the two powersuppliescanbe
eliminatedascandidates(theymustbeworking at time 3 or theV steppermotor couldnot beworking
at time 5).
As illustratedin theabovediscussion,theresultsof thediagnosisis asetof componentfailuresthat
arepossiblecausesof theobservedsymptomsasexpressedby normalandabnormalalarms.Generally,
theavailability of moredetailednormaland abnormalalarminformationmakespossiblemorespecific
or accuratediagnosesin that smallersetsof candidatecomponentfailurescanbe identified. Ideally,the
normaland abnormalalarminformationis obtainedfrom continuous,automatedmonitoring performed
on the observablesystemcomponentsto provide the maximumamountof informationon which the
diagnosiscanoperate.Onceasetof possiblecausesis identified,thehumanoperatoris ableto perform
diagnosticson the candidatesto further identify the exact causeof the system'sfailure symptoms.
Alternatively, theoperatorcanalter theoperationof thesystemto bypassor minimize theeffectof the
potentiallyfaulty componentsidentifiedby the diagnosis.
5 APPLICATION OF IGBDM TO A GENERAL DATA SYSTEM
The initial role we envision for our automated fault management computer program (Integrated
Graph-Based Diagnosis Method) applied to general data management systems is one of an advisor
to human operators of the system. The system digraph model will have been built by the engineers
responsible for designing the system itself. Displays of the digraph model, the system schematic(s), and
optionally the fault tree model would be available to system operators on workstation monitor screens.
The outputs of the sensors in the system would be connected to monitoring devices that could signal the
diagnosis program if any out-of-tolerance conditions arise. Automated monitoring of this type would
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beespeciallyuseful for largecomplexdatamanagementsystems.Upon theoccurrenceof one or more
componentfailures,thediagnosisprogramwould readthesymptomdata(suppliedby thesensormonitors
in terms of normal and abnormalalarms)into the digraph/faulttreemodel and initiate the diagnosis
process.The resultsof the diagnosiscould bedisplayedsimultaneouslyon the fault tree,digraph,and
schematicviews of the systemfor the operatorby usingcolor highlightingof the componentscausing
the failure. The diagnosissystemcould thenoptionally display suggestionsto the operatorson such
mattersaswhat further diagnostictests(if any)wouldbe appropriateto run, how the systemcould be
reconfiguredto circumventthe failed components,and how operatingproceduresshouldbe modified
to work aroundthe effect of thefailures. This informationmaybe simply retrievedfrom a previously
establishedoperatingproceduresdatabaseby keying on the remainingoperationalconfigurationof
the system.Further enhancementsof the advisoryfunction may be providedby connectingthe fault
treemodelwith a hypertextsystemcontaininginformationaboutcomponent/subsystemspecifications
and characteristics,and operatingprocedures.This would provide the operatorswith an interactive
information resourcefor exploringways to evaluatetheseverityof thefailuresand their effectsand to
defineor identify potentialwork-aroundsto them.
The eventualintendedrole of IGBDM is as anautomateddiagnosisandrecovery system.In this
capacityIGBDM will be capableof monitoring of systemsensorsand detectionof incorrect sensor
outputs,diagnosingthe causesof failure symptomsobservedthroughsensormonitoring, reconfiguring
thesystemto bypassfailed componentsand/oralteringtheoperatingprocessesof thesystemto mitigate
the effectof the failures. Sucha capabilitywould increaseboth the reliability andthe performanceof
systems,particularly systemsfor which humanmaintenanceandrepairareavailableonly rarely,or not
at all. To achievethis level of automation,our diagnosisand recoverycomputerprogrammust have
someadditionalcapabilitiesbeyondthosealreadydescribed.We discussthe mostimportant of these
additionalcapabilitiesin thenext section.
6 FUTURE WORK
We have described in a previous section the scope of the fault management problem, which is
addressed by our current implementation of our fault diagnosis/management approach. In this section
we identify some additional aspects of the fault management problem, which we hope to address in
future development of our current work.
The implementation of our approach to fault diagnosis and management so far has concentrated
on primarily passive processing of input data from sensors and/or human operators. In many cases this
alone may be sufficient to arrive at a satisfactory diagnosis of the component/subsystem failures that are
affecting the system. However, there may be situations in which a more active process is useful. The
passive analysis will identify a number of components/subsystems that may have failed. Once these
candidate subsystems are identified, further diagnostics may be required to positively confirm which sub-
systems have failed and which have not. Because the structure of the fault tree encodes the "production
rules" in the knowledge base that are necessary for inferential diagnostic reasoning, the identification
of a failed subsystem (consequent of a rule) corresponds to the selection of an intermediate event node
in the fault tree which represents the subsystem of interest. The object-oriented representation for the
fault tree we are using lends itself very well to incorporating active procedures into the analysis process.
For example, the object which denotes the subsystem of interest may contain a pointer to a subroutine
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that is to be executedwheneverthe subsystemis identified as potentially failed. The subroutine might
implement diagnostic routines specifically designed to ascertain the operational status of the subsystem.
Alternatively, the subroutine might initiate an automatic reconfiguration intended to bypass the failed
subsystem or modify its operation so that it is more consistent with an impaired operational status. The
subroutine might even serve both functions--running an appropriate diagnostic suite on the candidate
subsystem, then initiating reconfiguration only upon confirmation that the subsystem has experienced
a failure. Alternatively, the subroutine's function may be limited to printing recommendations for cor-
reciive action to the human operators of the system. In this way, the diagnostic analysis process can
include active components that can be incorporated in a natural way due to the nature of the augmented
fault tree model of the system.
There is another aspect of potential interest that may be readily integrated into the diagnosis analysis
process, largely because of the nature of augmented fault tree models. There may be situations in which it
would be advantageous to be able to integrate reliability evaluation with fault diagnosis. This capability
might assist in deciding which set of candidate faults to investigate first, or which set of competing faults
should receive priority in devising work-around procedures. Fault trees are a well-established reliability
modeling technique. The diagnosis method we advocate here utilizes fault trees in a capacity other
than their traditional reliability modeling role. The object-oriented structure we use for the augmented
fault tree makes it easy to accommodate both diagnosis and reliability modeling simultaneously within
the same fault tree model. Each object that represents an event in the fault tree, whether basic or
intermediate, needs only to include a field to contain information about the component's failure rate or
the event's probability of occurrence. As a consequence, reliability evaluation and fault diagnosis can
easily be integrated together in a natural way. We hope to be able to extend our fault diagnosis program
to incorporate both reliability modeling and active diagnosis processing in future development of our
fault management/diagnosis program.
7 CONCLUSION
We have described a new method for automated fault management using graph-based models. Our
method uses both digraphs and fault trees as underlying system models for the analysis process. This
method is one that has evolved from a number of previously existing methods which use graph-based
models. Our method is suitable for application to general data management systems. It is intended to
assist the operators of such systems in assessing the causes of system failure symptoms and to decide
on appropriate corrective action to take in response to the system impairment(s). We have presented
an example application of our fault management method to illustrate its use. We are in the process of
implementing this method in the form of a computer program running under the Unix(TM) operating
system and the X Windows user environment. We are also exploring the development of more expanded
roles for this methodology, including topics such as the integration of our fault diagnosis method with
reliability modeling methods.
20
8 REFERENCES
1. Miller, Jim: FEAT User's Manual (Draft). Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Rep., 1991.
2. Clark, Colin; Jowers, Steven; McNenny, Robert; Culbert, Chris; Kirby, Sarah; and Lauritsen, Janet:
Fault Management for the Space Station Freedom Control Center. In Proceedings of the 30th
Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit, Reno, NV, January 6-9, 1992.
3. Narayanan, N. Hari; and Viswanadham, N.: A Methodology for Knowledge Acquisition and
Reasoning in Failure Analysis of Systems. IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics,
vol. 17, no. 2, 1987, pp. 274--288.
4. Iverson, David L.; and Patterson-Hine, Francis A.: A Diagnosis System Using Object-Oriented
Fault Tree Models. In Proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial Intelligence for Space
Applications, Huntsville, AL, May 22-23, 1990.
5. Iverson, David L.; and Patterson-Hine, Francis A.: Object-Oriented Fault Tree Models Applied to
System Diagnosis. AAIC Paper, April 1990.
6. Patterson-Hine, Francis A.; and Iverson, David L.: An Integrated Approach to System Design,
Reliability, and Diagnosis. NASA TM-102861, 1990.
7. Patterson-Hine, Francis A.: Object-Oriented Programming Applied to the Evaluation of Reliability
Fault Trees. Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Texas at Austin, 1988.
8. Iverson, David L.: Automatic Translation of Digraph to Fault Tree Models. In Proceedings of the
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. Las Vegas, NV, January 21-24, 1992.
21
Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE oM8No.o7o4-o188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources.
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aipect of this
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Direclorate for information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCYUSE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
September 1993
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Fault Management for Data Systems
3. REPORTYPEANDDATESCOVERED
Technical Memorandum
6. AUTHOR(S)
Mark A. Boyd, David L. Iverson, and F. Ann Patterson-Hine
7. PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
9. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
S. FUNDING NUMBERS
476-14-03
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
A-92147
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
NASA TM- 103953
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Point of Contact: Mark A. Boyd, Ames Research Center, MS 269-3, Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
(415) 604-3678
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified-Unlimited
Subject Category - 51
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
I
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
We consider issues related to automating the process of fault management (fault diagnosis and response)
for data management systems. Substantial benefits are to be gained by successful automation of this process,
particularly for large, complex systems. We advocate the use of graph-based models to develop a computer-
assisted fault management system. We begin by describing the general problem and outlining the motivation
behind choosing graph-based models over other approaches for developing fault diagnosis computer
programs. We review some existing work in the area of graph-based fault diagnosis, and offer a new fault
management method which we have developed from existing methods. We apply our method to an automatic
telescope system intended as a prototype for future lunar telescope programs. Finally, we describe an
application of our method to general data management systems.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Fault management, Graph based models, Automated diagnosis
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
i "
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
22
16. PRICE CODE
A02
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) "
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-1S
